BusinessSolvency User Manual · Alpha Testing
Part Three — Setting Up and Managing Financial Results
Chapter 8E

Worked Example — Coastline Leagues & Community Club Ltd

A Queensland licensed club borrows to renovate, then a downturn arrives. A short-term loan and unpaid suppliers keep the bank balance looking healthy while the club slides towards insolvency. The warning case.

Club directorsAccountants & auditors
The point of this chapter (for your learning)

A healthy bank balance can hide a club that is already in serious trouble.

What it covers

Six years of a licensed club run as a company limited by guarantee: the renovation, the downturn, the warning signs, and where carrying on as before leads.

Why it matters

After the renovation, Coastline no longer had a sustainable cashflow, and it never built a real cash reserve: by FY2027 its cash was borrowed. Its directors carry the full section 588G duty, unpaid or not.

The takeaway

Read the forecast, treat borrowing for running costs as a warning, and take advice the moment the signs appear.

“In the year Coastline lost $717,000, its bank balance went up. The forecast told the truth.”
Start with the story in one minute ↓Accountants: go straight to the numbers ↓
In This Chapter
The story
  1. The story in one minute
  2. 8E.1 — Meet the club
  3. 8E.2 — The cash picture at a glance
  4. 8E.3 — What happened, year by year (actual)
  5. 8E.4 — The warning signs the board should have seen
  6. 8E.5 — If the board carries on as before (forecast)
  7. 8E.6 — What the board could do now
  8. 8E.7 — What this example teaches
For accountants: the numbers
  1. 8E.8 — The six years in figures: every key figure, the cash movements and the solvency ratios, FY2025–FY2030

The story in one minute

  1. In FY2026 Coastline renovated for $2,600,000, borrowing $2,000,000 to do it.
  2. In FY2027 trade fell 8% and the club lost $717,000.
  3. A $400,000 short-term loan and slower payments to suppliers kept the bank at $458,790, higher than the year before.
  4. If the board carries on as before, the club is overdrawn by $148,252 in FY2028 and by $1,608,587 by FY2030.
  5. Its directors carry the full company-director duty. The time to take advice was FY2027, while the club still had choices.

⚠ A fictional club, real arithmetic

This club is fictional, built from patterns common in Queensland clubs. Every figure in this chapter comes from the BusinessSolvency calculation engine. FY2025–FY2027 are the “actual” years; FY2028–FY2030 are the forecast, marked (F). General information only, not financial or legal advice.

Section 8E.1
Meet the club

In short: a Queensland leagues club turning over about $10 million a year, run by a volunteer board of directors.

Coastline Leagues & Community Club Ltd is a fictional licensed club in Queensland: bars, a bistro, function rooms and gaming machines, with about $10 million of revenue a year and a large staff. It is a company limited by guarantee, so its volunteer directors are company directors, and the section 588G duty not to let the company trade while insolvent applies to them in full (Chapter 2A).

Most of its income comes from members, which is not taxed. It pays tax only on its trade with non-members, which works out at an effective rate of 7.5% of its surplus (Chapter 2C.3). It owns its premises, valued in the accounts at $5,500,000.

Section 8E.2
The cash picture at a glance

In short: cash looked steady for three years, then the forecast falls off a cliff.

Coastline: cash at the end of each year

FORECAST ACTUAL −⁠$2.0m −⁠$1.5m −⁠$1.0m −⁠$0.5m $0.0m $406,000 FY2025 $361,500 FY2026 $458,790 FY2027 −⁠$148,252 FY2028 −⁠$841,408 FY2029 −⁠$1,608,587 FY2030

FY2025–FY2027 actual, FY2028–FY2030 forecast if the board carries on as before (shaded). Note that cash at the end of FY2027 was higher than the year before, in the year the club lost $717,000.

Section 8E.3
What happened, year by year (actual)

In short: a borrowed renovation, then a downturn; by FY2027 the club was losing $717,000 and holding up its bank balance with a short-term loan and unpaid suppliers.

FY2025 · A comfortable yearPaying its way
$9,900,000revenue
$486,550surplus or deficit
$406,000cash at year end
1.14short-term assets per $1 owed short-term

Revenue of $9,900,000 left a surplus of $486,550, and cash closed at $406,000. Trading cash covered loan repayments about three times over. One quiet warning: short-term assets only just covered short-term debts ($1.14 for every $1 owed).

FY2026 · The $2.6 million renovationOnly just
$10,400,000revenue
$309,320surplus or deficit
$361,500cash at year end
1.10short-term assets per $1 owed short-term

The board renovated the club for $2,600,000, borrowing $2,000,000 to pay for it. Long-term debt rose to $2,950,000. Revenue grew 5% to $10,400,000, but interest doubled and depreciation rose, so the surplus fell to $309,320. Counting every payment, including the renovation, the club only just paid its way ($863 short).

FY2027 · The downturnWarning
$9,550,000revenue
−⁠$717,000surplus or deficit
$458,790cash at year end
0.63short-term assets per $1 owed short-term

Spending at the bar and on the machines fell, and revenue dropped 8% to $9,550,000. Wages, insurance and interest did not fall. The club made a loss of $717,000. Trading cash of $47,290 could not come close to covering $250,000 of loan repayments (loan cover 0.10).

To keep going, the board took a $400,000 short-term loan, and suppliers waited longer to be paid: what the club owed them rose from $460,000 to $690,000. Short-term debts now outweighed short-term assets ($0.63 for every $1 owed).

And the bank? $458,790, higher than the year before.

Section 8E.4
The warning signs the board should have seen

In short: in FY2027 BusinessSolvency flagged threatened borrowing, loan repayments not covered, and short-term debts larger than short-term assets.

Watch out: the target looked met, and that is the trap

In FY2027 the club technically met its Sustainable Cashflow target, by $134,390. That was only because the $400,000 short-term loan counts as cash coming in. This is exactly why BusinessSolvency flags threatened borrowing on its own: a target met with borrowed money is not a target met.

Section 8E.5
If the board carries on as before (forecast)

In short: revenue up 3% a year, costs up 4%: the club runs out of cash in FY2028 and is $1.66 million overdrawn by FY2030.

FY2028 (F) · Carrying on as beforeOverdrawn
$9,836,500revenue
−⁠$806,620surplus or deficit
−⁠$148,252cash at year end
0.22short-term assets per $1 owed short-term

Revenue grows 3% to $9,836,500, but costs rise 4% with inflation, so the club falls further behind in real terms. The loss is $806,620 and the bank is overdrawn by $148,252. Trading cash does not cover loan repayments at all.

FY2029 (F) · Carrying on as beforeOverdrawn
$10,131,595revenue
−⁠$875,601surplus or deficit
−⁠$841,408cash at year end
0.15short-term assets per $1 owed short-term

Revenue grows 3% to $10,131,595, but costs rise 4% with inflation, so the club falls further behind in real terms. The loss is $875,601 and the bank is overdrawn by $841,408. Trading cash does not cover loan repayments at all.

FY2030 (F) · Carrying on as beforeOverdrawn
$10,435,543revenue
−⁠$950,509surplus or deficit
−⁠$1,608,587cash at year end
0.11short-term assets per $1 owed short-term

Revenue grows 3% to $10,435,543, but costs rise 4% with inflation, so the club falls further behind in real terms. The loss is $950,509 and the bank is overdrawn by $1,608,587. Trading cash does not cover loan repayments at all.

Urgent: this will catch you out

A forecast that shows the bank overdrawn by $148,252 next year, with short-term debts already larger than short-term assets, is a strong sign the club may already be unable to pay its debts as they fall due. The directors of a company limited by guarantee face the full section 588G exposure (Chapter 2A), including personal liability for unpaid PAYG, GST and super. Every new debt the club takes on from here is a personal risk for each director.

Section 8E.6
What the board could do now

In short: take advice immediately, stop borrowing to cover running costs, and decide on a rescue plan while the club still owns valuable assets.

Unlike Riverbend, Coastline’s forecast does not include a rescue plan, so the options below are not modelled in the figures. They are the kinds of choices a board in this position could consider, with advice:

  1. Take advice now from the club’s accountant and a registered insolvency practitioner, before taking on any new debt.
  2. Consider the safe harbour (Chapter 2A.4). It can protect directors who are developing a plan reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome, but only if employee entitlements are paid, tax lodgements are up to date, and the steps are documented.
  3. Cut the cost base to fit the revenue: trading hours, rosters, and spending that does not pay for itself.
  4. Talk to the lender about the repayments before one is missed.
  5. Look at the assets. The club owns premises valued at $5,500,000. Selling or leasing part of them could repay debt, but only as part of a plan that also fixes the yearly shortfall.
  6. Tell the members, with the facts, at a general meeting.

Remember this

The BusinessSolvency score for Coastline’s actual years is 40 out of 100. Carrying on as before, the forecast score is 7. In FY2027 the club still had choices. Each year it waits, there are fewer.

Section 8E.7
What this example teaches

In short: a large club can look safe on its bank balance while it is already in serious trouble.

  1. Look at the forecast, not the bank balance. Cash went up in the year the club lost $717,000.
  2. Borrowing to cover running costs is a warning, not a fix. The short-term loan made the year look better and the future worse.
  3. Revenue must keep pace with costs. Growing 3% a year while costs grow 4% is going backwards.
  4. Plan the running costs of a renovation, not just the build. Interest and depreciation rose immediately; the extra trade it was meant to bring did not arrive.
  5. Volunteer directors carry the full duty. Being unpaid does not lessen it (Chapter 2A).
For accountants: the numbers

The key figures for all six years, straight from the BusinessSolvency calculation engine. Directors can stop here, or read on.

Section 8E.8
The six years in figures

In short: every key figure for FY2025–FY2030 in one table, with the cash movements and the solvency ratios year by year.

FigureFY2025FY2026FY2027FY2028 (F)FY2029 (F)FY2030 (F)
Revenue$9,900,000$10,400,000$9,550,000$9,836,500$10,131,595$10,435,543
Surplus or deficit (Net Income)$486,550$309,320−⁠$717,000−⁠$806,620−⁠$875,601−⁠$950,509
Tax on the surplus (7.5%)$39,450$25,080$0$0$0$0
Trading cash (operating cash flow)$906,000$805,500$47,290−⁠$207,042−⁠$293,156−⁠$367,179
Spent on equipment and buildings−⁠$300,000−⁠$2,600,000−⁠$100,000−⁠$150,000−⁠$150,000−⁠$150,000
New borrowing$0$2,000,000$400,000$0$0$0
Loan repayments−⁠$200,000−⁠$250,000−⁠$250,000−⁠$250,000−⁠$250,000−⁠$250,000
Levies, grants and appeals$0$0$0$0$0$0
Cash at start of year$0$406,000$361,500$458,790−⁠$148,252−⁠$841,408
Cash at year end$406,000$361,500$458,790−⁠$148,252−⁠$841,408−⁠$1,608,587
ATO amounts owing$39,450$0$0$0$0$0
Short-term loans$0$0$400,000$400,000$400,000$400,000
Long-term debt$1,200,000$2,950,000$2,700,000$2,450,000$2,200,000$1,950,000
Suppliers owed (trade creditors)$420,000$460,000$690,000$700,000$700,000$700,000
Sustainable Cashflow target: revenue above (+) or below (−) it+$465,922−⁠$863+$134,390−⁠$745,090−⁠$817,032−⁠$904,291
Loan cover (DSCR): trading cash ÷ loan repayments3.121.870.10−0.44−0.64−0.83
Current Ratio: short-term assets ÷ short-term debts1.141.100.630.220.150.11
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